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I. INTRODUCTION
In Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L 'anza ResearchInternational,Inc.,'
the Supreme Court held that a copyright owner's right to bar imports is
restricted by the first sale doctrine.2 The first sale doctrine prohibits copyright
owners, who consented to the sale of a copy, from conditioning the sale or
other disposition of that copy.3 The Quality King holding, which resolved a
split between the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, marks the first time that
the Supreme Court has reviewed a Section 602(a) copyright importation case.
This case focuses on a copyright infringement claim brought by L'anza
Research International against Quality King Distributors pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)." The dispute at issue involves the interrelationship between Sections
602, 106 and 109 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The relevant portion of Section
*
B.B.A., 1995; J.D., 1999, University of Miami. This is dedicated to my parents, Eddy and Maria
Teresa Gonzalez, and my brother, Eddy, Jr., for always being there for me.
523 U.S. 135 (1998).
2

See id.

The first sale doctrine is embodied in Section 109(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, which states
as follows: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 106(3), i.e., the distribution right, the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this ide... is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."
4
See L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir.
1996).
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602 prohibits the unauthorized importation into the United States of copies of
a work acquired outside the United States.' Section 106(3)6 grants the
copyright owner exclusive rights to distribute copies of the copyrighted work
through any transfer of ownership. However, these distribution rights are
subject to Sections 107 through 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act.7 Thus, the
first sale doctrine, which is embodied in Section 109(a), expressly limits the
distribution rights granted to the copyright owner.' The interplay of these
three sections of the 1976 Copyright Act underlies the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision.
This note will analyze the Supreme Court's Quality King decision and its
implication for the future of copyright law. Part II discusses the factual
background and procedural history surrounding the case. Part HI examines the
relevant statutory language and its legislative intent. Part IV provides a look
at the Ninth Circuit decision in L 'anza ResearchInternational,Inc. v. Quality
King Distributors,Inc. as well as examines the conflicting approach taken in
Sebastian International,Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd. Part V
examines and supports the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Copyright
Act in Quality King. Part VI provides an analysis and critique of the Quality
King decision in light of prior caselaw. Part VII concludes with a look at the
rationale behind Quality King and some of the alternatives remaining for
copyright owners to combat the gray market after the decision.
H. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent L'anza Research International, Inc. is a California
manufacturer and distributor of copyrighted hair care products.9 L'anza's
business involves "manufacturing and selling shampoos, conditioners, and
other hair care products."'l L'anza sells its hair care products exclusively to
United States distributors who have agreed to sell L'anza's products only to

5 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) provides as follows: "Importation into the United States, without the
authority of the owner of a copyright under this tide,of copies... of a work that have been acquired outside
the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies... under section 106,
actionable under section 501."
6
17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994) provides as follows: "The owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:... (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."
7
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
9
See. e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at79 (1979) ("Section 109(a) restates and confirms" the first
sale doctrine embodied by prior case law.); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 71 (1975).
9
10

See L'anza, 98 F.3d at 1111.

Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'i, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998).
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authorized retailers such as beauty salons and professional hair care colleges."
This requirement is necessary to maintain L'anza' s reputation for high quality
products and to take advantage of L'anza's extensive advertising and
promotional activities in the United States. 2
In foreign markets, L'anza sells its hair care products through "master
distributors."' 3 Since L'anza is not engaged in extensive promotional and
training activities outside of the United States, these "master distributors" pay
35 to 40% less than domestic distributors for L'anza's products.' 4
Additionally, these overseas distributors must promote and market the
products themselves. 5 In this regard, it is important to note that L'anza has
into the United States of any of its products
never authorized the importation
6
abroad.'
sold
were
that
Between 1992 and 1993, L'anza's United Kingdom distributor sold three
shipments of L'anza's products to a distributor in Malta. I" Each shipment of
L'anza's product was affixed with copyrighted labels. 8 Although it is
uncertain who was the initial purchaser of the goods, it is clear that L'anza
initially manufactured the goods and then sold to a distributor outside the
United States.'9
There is also uncertainty as to who was the actual importer of L'anza's
goods. However, it is undisputed that Quality King bought the three
shipments of L'anza's products from the distributor in Malta."° Subsequently,
Quality King imported and resold L'anza's goods without L'anza's
authorization.2 '
L'anza filed a complaint against Quality King and several other
defendants22 for violating Sections 106, 501, and 602 of the 1976 Copyright

1

See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138 (American public is unwilling to pay higher price for quality

products sold alongside less expensive and lower quality products that arecarried by supermarkets and drug
stores).
12

13
14
15
16
17

Is

See
See
See
See

id at 138-39.
id at 139.
id.
id.

See id.
See id.

See id.
See id. ("The record does not establish whether the initial purchaser was the distributor in the
United Kingdom or the distributor in Malta, or whether title passed when the goods were delivered to the
carrier or when they arrived to their destination.").
0
See id.
21
See id.
2
See id. The other defendants referred to retailers who purchased L'anza's products from Quality
King and were selling them. The claims against these retailers were settled and a default judgment was
entered against the Malta distributor.
9
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Act." L'anza alleged that Quality King and the other defendants imported
L'anza's copyrighted products without authorization.u Quality King denied
the allegations and sought protection through the first sale doctrine of 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) and the unclean hands doctrine." The district court denied
Quality King's arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of
26
L' anza.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding." The court relied on the proposition "that § 602(a) would be
rendered meaningless if § 109(a) were found to supersede the prohibition on
importation in this case.' '2 8 Because the Ninth Circuit's decision was in
conflict with the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Sebastian
International,Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.,29 the Supreme Court

granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
III. HISTORY AND INTENT BEHIND SECTIONS 106(3), 109(A) AND 602(A)
OF THE 1976 COPYRIGHT Acr

The First Congress enacted the first copyright law of the United States in
1790.30 It was enacted "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.'
These rights are limited,
however, and are not to be used so as to provide special benefits. 32 Rather,
they are intended to "motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has

2
24

See id at 139-40.
See L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109,1112 (9th Cir.

1996).
2s

See id.

26

See id.

2

See id. at 1114.
Id.

n'

847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 1 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660.
31
See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. L § 8).
32
See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984); see also H.R.
REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) (Copyright legislation was not enacted by Congress based on a "natural right
that an author has in his writings .... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and
progress of science useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive
rights to their writings.").
29
30
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expired."3 3 The primary effect of copyright law is thus to encourage artistic
creativity for the benefit of the public good.'
From its very beginning, copyright law has developed through significant
achievements and changes in technology.3 5 Because of this extensive
technological advancement, copyright law is highly unstable.36 As a result,
copyright statutes have continuously been amended.37 A majority of these
amendments have involved a balancing of the copyright owners' interests in
controlling their works with the public interest in the ideas, information and
commerce provided by the copyright.38 "Ultimately, the copyright law regards
financial reward to the owner as a secondary consideration."39 This
proposition is essential in properly understanding the circumstances
surrounding the Supreme Court's analysis and decision in Quality King.
As technology has developed, Congress has been responsible for enacting
copyright legislation to keep up to date with the rapid changes.' Prior to the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, discussions concerning a revision of
the copyright law lasted over twenty years.4 ' These discussions involved
major studies as well as included input by representatives of various interested
parties.42 Of particular note to Quality King, the revision hearings revealed
the copyright owners' concerns in protecting their copyrights from
unauthorized piratical copies, as well as from copies that were made by
licensees outside the United States.4 3 The statutory material and legislative

Sony, 464 U.S. at 429; see also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
("'The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors:); see also Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts (PTY) Ld.. 847 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1988).
34
See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States
33

and the primary object in conferring monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors.").
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660 (Since the first copyright law of the United States was enacted in 1790,
35

"significant changes in technology have affected the operation of the copyright law.").
3
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, AssertingCopyright's Democratic Principles in the GlobalArena,
51 VAND. L REV. 217, 225 (1998).
3
See Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1095.
38
See id.
39
Id.
40
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
41
See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder. 469 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1985).
42
See id
43
See Tyson & Parker, Parallel Importation of Copyrighted Phonorecords, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L
& COM. REG. 397, 402-406 (1985); see also Stephen W. Feingold, Parallel Importing Under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL 113, 134-137 (1984).
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history of the 1976 Copyright Act provides valuable insight in understanding
the interrelationship between Sections 106, 602, and 109 of the Act.
A. Section 106
Copyright law grants owners of literary property exclusive rights in their
works of original expression. Copyright protection exists in all forms of
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 44
The copyright holder is granted five exclusive rights which are enumerated in
Section 106 of the Copyright Act: 1) the right to reproduce the work; 2) the
right to prepare derivative versions of the work; 3) the right to publicly
distribute copies of the work; 4) the right to perform the work in public; and
5) the right to display the work in public.4'
Although the owner of a copyrighted work is not granted an absolute
monopoly on the work, anyone who uses the copyrighted work within the
scope enumerated by Section 106 is considered an "infringer of the copyright"
under Section 501." Conversely, a person who is authorized by the copyright
owner to use the work in one of the five ways enumerated in the statute is not
considered an infringer of the copyright. However, the copyright owner does
not lose or waive his rights by granting a right to another.4 7
Relevant to the issues presented in Quality King, Section 106(3) grants the
copyright owner an exclusive right to sell, dispose, or give away any material
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994)
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to
do and to authorize any of the following:
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
and (5)in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
46
17 U.S.C. § 501 (a) (1994) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United
States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright."); see generally Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,433 (1984); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Blazon, Inc.
v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Oakes v. Suelynn Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Jewelers Circular
Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Pubi'g Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922); Morris
County Traction Co. v. Hence, 281 F. 820 (3d Cir. 1922).
47
See Interstate Hotel Co. v. Remick Music Corp., 157 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1946).
4

4s
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embodiment of his copyrighted work.48 This section grants the copyright
owner the right of first publication4 9 of copies of a work by sale, gift, or other
form of transfer.' Therefore, distributions by unauthorized copyright holders
to the public are considered to be an infringement of the copyrighted work."'
It is important to remember that although the five enumerated rights granted
under Section 106 should be interpreted broadly, they are still "subject to
sections 107 through 120" of the Copyright Act.52 Thus, Section 109 of the
Copyright Act qualifies Section 106(3) by extinguishing the copyright owner's
exclusive rights once he has distributed or transferred ownership of a
particular copy or phonorecord.5 3
B. Section 109
Although the first sale doctrine is statutory, it has "its roots in the English
common law rule against restraints on alienation of property."' The doctrine
was initially codified in the 1909 Copyright Act, 55 recodified in 1947,56 and
included in the 1976 Copyright Act.5 The economic rationale behind the
doctrine is based on determining whether or not the copyright owner has
received his "reward" for the use of his work. 58

See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994)
"'Publication' is the distribution ofcopies orphonorecords to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending ....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
50
See Act of Sept. 29, 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 5675; see also
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (Section 106(3) "recognizes
for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which had previously been an element of the
common-law protections afforded unpublished works.").
51
See Act of Sept. 29, 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 5676.
52
17 U.S.C. § 106(1994); see also S. REP. No. 93-983, at 131 (1974) ("The approach of the bill
is to set forth the copyright owner's exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and then to provide
various limitations, qualifications, or exemptions in the 11 sections that follow ... Thus, everything in
section 106... must be read in conjunction with those provisions.").
53
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 (Supreme Court
acknowledged special protection for the right of first publication in light of the fact that only one person
can be considered the first publisher).
54
H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2899, 2901 ("American
courts have affirmed the doctrine and distinguished between the owner's exclusive rights in the copyright
and the rights of the owner of an object embodying a work that is under copyright"); see also Burke &
Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Richard Colby, The First
Sale Doctrine - The Defense That Never Was?, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 77,89 (1984); 2 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.12 (1997).
55
Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (1909).
56
Copyright Act, ch. 391, § 1, 61 Stat. 652 (1947).
57
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994).
38
See Burke & Van Heusen, 233 F. Supp. at 884; see also Sebastian Int'l Inc. v. Consumer
4

49
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The first sale doctrine attempts to limit the copyright owners' control of
copies of the work once they consent to distribution.59 It is only this initial
distribution6' which triggers the Section 109(a) termination of the distribution
right.6 1 Distribution seems to be considered the point at which "the policy
favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to the policy opposing
restraints of trade and restraints on alienation." 62
At this point, a copyright owner's right to prevent unauthorized
distribution of the work is unnecessary because the owner has already
consented to sale or distribution of copies of the work.63 Thus, once the owner
of the copyright transfers ownership of a copy of his work, his distribution
rights are limited by the first sale doctrine." In addition, the person who
acquires ownership of the particular copy may dispose of the copy by sale,
rental, or any other means.65 Note, however, that the particular copy or
phonorecord involved in the transaction must have been lawfully made under
Title 17.66
C. Section 602
Congress added Section 602 to the 1979 Copyright Act in order to respond
to the multitude of copyright holders who sought protection from the
unauthorized importation of copies or what is also known as the gray market.67

Contacts (PTY) Lid., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir. 1988); Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc.,
315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963); Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., No. 85-0651, 1985 WL 2209
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 1985).
59
See 2 NIMMER & NIW4ER, supra note 54, § 8.12[A].
60
The "distribution right under Section 106(3) includes the right to control not only the sale of
copies and phonorecords, but also their disposition by rental, lease or lending." 2 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 54, § 8.12[B][1].
61
See id. ("sale of a copy or phonorecord (or other transfer of title) will vitiate the copyright
owner's power to prevent not only further sales, but also further physical disposition of such copies or
phonorecords, even if such further disposition does not involve a transfer of title").
62
Id.; see also Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
63
See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 54, § 8.12[B] [11.
See Act of Sept. 11, 1984, Pub. L No. 98-450, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2898.
See Act of Sept. 29, 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 5675; see also 2
N1MMER & NIMMER, supra note 54, § 8.12[B] (1997). Further support for this interpretation is found in
Section 109(a)'s predecessor, Section 27 of the 1909 Act. Although Section 109(a) is not identical to
Section 27, it is very similar. The second clause of Section 27 of the 1909 Act states "nothing in this title
shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work, the possession
of which has been lawfully obtained."
See H.R. REP. No.94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693.
67
See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d at 1093, 1097 (3d Cir.
1988).
6
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The gray market is created by the parallel importation6 of foreign
manufactured merchandise bearing United States trademarks into the United
States.69
The problem with these imports is that even though they are made with the
copyright owner's consent, they are piratical 0 in the sense that they could be
sold at a lower price than the U.S. manufactured products."' These cheaper
resales eventually undercut the prices available through authorized channels
and create intraband price competition.72
Furthermore, gray markets have the potential to undermine the goodwill
traditionally created by the manufacturer's extensive investment. Thus, the
copyright owner will be forced to choose between increasing its own warranty
costs in order to protect its rights and maintaining the goodwill of its U.S.
manufacturers. In essence, these gray markets can substantially diminish the
U.S. copyright owner's profit margin as well as potential royalty payments.73
Section 602 offers protection to copyright holders by providing that
unauthorized importation into the United States of copies of a work is
considered to be an infringement of the copyright holder's distribution right.74
The legislative history of Section 602 provides support for this contention in
that the House Judiciary Committee explained that Section 602 was passed to
address piratical importation and importation of products lawfully produced
abroad." As Quality King illustrates, however, Section 602 can also be
interpreted in a second way.

a

See K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1988) ("Gray market" and the practice
of "parallel importation" was used to refer to the unauthorized importation into the United States of goods
manufactured abroad with a valid United States trademark); see also Feingold, supra note 43, at 114
(defining parallel imports as any imports in which there is an existing U.S. copyright owner).
69
See Sebastian Int'l, 847 F.2d at 1097.
70
Piracy is the practice of reproducing a work without the permission of the owner of the
copyright. See Feingold, supra note 43, at 68.
7'
See id. at 115-16.
72
See id. at 116.
7
See id.; see also K-Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that the parallel importation of goods manufactured abroad affixed with United States
trademarks has developed into a multi-billion dollar industry).
74
See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) (providing that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner as provided by Sections 106 through 118 or of the author as provided in Section
106(a) or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of Section 602 is
infringing on the copyright or the right of the author, as the case may be).
7
See H.R. REP.No.94-1476, at60 (1976). reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5785 ("Section
602, which has nothing to do with the manufacturing requirements of section 601, deals with two separate
situations: importation of 'piratical' articles (that is, copies or phonorecords made without any authorization
of the copyright owner), and unauthorized importation of copies or phonorecords that were lawfully
made.").

38
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The heart of the issue in Quality King revolves around the interpretation
of the interrelationship between Sections 602(a) and 109(a). There exists two
possible ways to interpret the relationship between these sections. One such
interpretation suggests that Section 602(a) grants copyright owners an
additional right similar to the distribution rights granted under Section
106(3).76 Under this interpretation, Section 602(a) is immunized from the first
sale doctrine of Section 109(a) and thus allows copyright holders to prevent
the unauthorized importation of their copyrighted works."
On the other hand, Section 602(a) may be interpreted as an example of a
distribution right that is subject to the Section 109(a) limitation." This
interpretation would prohibit the U.S. copyright holder from preventing the
importation of unauthorized copies of his work that were "made abroad
pursuant to a license restricting sales to a particular country."79
Because there is no legislative history or statutory language specifically
addressing the interrelationship between Sections 602(a), 106(3), and 109(a),
cases discussing this relationship are of utmost importance. Particularly
significant is the Third Circuit's decision in Sebastian International,Inc. v.
Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.
IV. RELEVANT CASE LAW - THIRD CIRCUIT VS.

NINl" CIRCUIT

Sebastian involved a hair care product manufacturer, Sebastian
International, that brought a copyright infringement action against Consumer
Contacts." Consumer Contacts had entered into a contract with Sebastian
International to buy Sebastian hair care products and sell them exclusively to
salons in South Africa."' Consumer Contacts shipped the products to South
Africa, but some products found their way to the United States. 2 The district
court determined that although Section 602(a) and Section 109(a) seem to
conflict, they could be harmonized. 3
The circuit court determined that the situation presented in Sebastian
involved the unauthorized importation of goods that were lawfully made. 4 In
making its decision, the court noted both the struggle that district courts have

76
7
7
79

s
81

See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093,1097 (3d Cir. 1988).
See .
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1094.
See id.

3

See id.
See id.at 1097

'

See id.

82
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experienced in analyzing the relationship between Sections 602(a) and 109(a)
and the lack of statutory guidance."5 The circuit court rejected the trial court's
interpretation of the interrelationship between Sections 602(a) and 109(a) as
granting the copyright holder a "distinct right" that is free from the limitations
imposed by the first sale doctrine. 6
Instead, the Third Circuit in Sebastianfound that Section 602(a) is among
the distribution rights granted under Section 106(3) and is therefore subject
to the first sale doctrine. 7 The court stressed the lack of importance of
determining the place of sale when deciding whether or not Section 602(a)
applies. 8 More importantly, the court found that the copyright holder
relinquished all further rights "to sell or otherwise dispose of possession of
that copy" when he sold it. 9 The first sale doctrine prevented the copyright
holder from controlling future importation of the copies where the holder
already received a reward from an initial sale. 9* The court addressed concerns
over the "gray market" as a question that should be resolved by Congress. a"
The Ninth Circuit in L'anza ResearchInternational,Inc. v. Quality King
Distributors, Inc. addressed a similar situation as the Third Circuit in
Sebastian - unauthorized importation of lawfully made goods.' The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Sebastian court on the idea that the copyright holder
is entitled to receive a reward for his copyright.93 In addition, the L'anza court
agreed that once the copyright holder receives his reward, he is limited in his

9

See id. at 1097-98; see also, e.g., NeutrogenaCorp. v. United States, 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1900
(D.S.C. 1988) (finding the first sale defense available where personal care products were manufactured in
the United States, sold to third party, and then imported into the United States); T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem
Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575,1577 (D. N.J. 1987) (finding copyright infringement when phonorecords
manufactured and first sold under license in New Zealand were imported into the United States); Hearst
Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that Section 109(a) did not limit Section 602(a)
where books were lawfully made in England and imported into the United States); CBS, Inc. v. Scorpio
Music Distribs., 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding copyright infringement where copies made and
sold in the Philippines under license agreement were imported into the United States); Nintendo of
America, Inc. v. Elcon Indus., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (finding importation was prohibited
where video game circuits were made and sold abroad and then sent to the United States).
56
See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. ConsumerContacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093,1097 (3d Cir. 1988).
S
See id.
U
See id. at 1098.
99

Id.

90

See id. at 1099.

91

See id.

92

See L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 111 5.
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control over importation of the copy.94 However, the circuit court in L'anza
held that the first sale doctrine did not apply in this situation.95
The Ninth Circuit did not agree that the first sale provided the copyright
owner his full reward.96 Instead, the circuit court found that unauthorized
importation caused "copyright owners to lose control over domestic
distribution, thus driving prices down for goods sold through authorized
channels in the U.S. market."'9 The circuit court also determined that Section
602(a) would be rendered meaningless if Section 109(a) provided a defense
in a case like this, because a third party could circumvent the copyright owner
by purchasing copies abroad.9" Consequently, the L'anza decision created a
split between the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit that led to the grant of
certiorari in Quality King.

V. QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. V. L'ANzA RESEARCH
INTERNATIONA4 INC.

The Supreme Court in Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L 'anza Research
International,Inc. unanimously held that the copyright owner's right to
prohibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted works does not extend
to the "gray market" area where the goods are manufactured in the United
States.99 The Supreme Court interpreted the language of Section 602(a) as
defining a violation of the copyright holder's distribution right under Section
106, rather than an additional right independent of the Section 109 importation
right. 1" Since Section 602 is considered to fall under the umbrella of Section
106, it is undoubtedly limited by the first sale doctrine of Section 109.101
The Quality King Court focused on the fact that Section 602 did not
"categorically prohibit the unauthorized importation of copyrighted
materials.""' ° Instead, Section 602 refers to unauthorized importations under
Section 106. °3 Since the limited right of distribution under Section 106 does
not refer to "resales by lawful owners," the Supreme Court found that the
clear language of Section 602(a) is plainly not applicable to situations where
the owners of L'anza's products decide to import them and resell them in the
94

See id.
See id. at 1113.
See id. at 1116.

97

Id. at I17.

99
10D

See id. at 1114.
See Quality King Distribs. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
See i

101

See id.

102

Sd. at 144.
See id.

103
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This result remains consistent whether the owners of
United States."
L'anza's products are domestic or foreign."°5
L'anza argued that the proper interpretation of Section 602 is an exclusive
right independent of the distribution rights granted in Section 106 because any
other interpretation would render Section 602 and its exceptions"
meaningless. 7 In support of its argument, L'anza made two textual
arguments based on the Copyright Act."°s
L'anza's first argument was that Section 602 and its exceptions "are
superfluous if limited by the first sale doctrine."'" The reason being that
since Section 602(b)"' already covers piratical goods, Section 602(a) must
cover non-piratical goods, meaning copies that are lawfully made and sold by
the copyright owner."' The Supreme Court found that Section 602(a) was not
rendered superfluous because Section 602(a) provides, among other things, a

IN4

Id.

See id. at 135 n.14 ("The owner of goods lawfully made under the Act is entitled to the
protection of the first sale doctrine in an action in a United States court even if the first sale occurred
abroad.").
106
The remainder of 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) reads as follows:
105

This subsection does not apply to (1) importation of copies or phonorecords under the authority
or for the use of the Government of the United States or of any State or political subdivision of
a State, but not including copies or phonorecords for use in schools, or copies of any audiovisual
work imported for purposes other than archival use; (2) importation, for the private use of the
importer and not for distribution, by any person with respect to no more than one copy or
phonorecord of any one work at any one time, or by any person arriving from outside the United
States with respect to copies or phonorecords forming part of such person's personal baggage;
or (3) importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or religious
purposes and not for private gain, with respect to no more than one copy of an audiovisual work
solely for its archival purposes, and no more than five copies or phonorecords of any other work
for its library lending or archival purposes, unless the importation of such copies or
phonorecords is part of an activity consisting of systematic reproduction or distribution, engaged
in by such organization in violation of the provisions of section 108(g)(2).
See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 145.
107
109
See id. at 145-46.
109

Id. at 145.

1o

17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1994) provides as follows:

"'

In a case where the making of the copies or phonorecords would have constituted an
infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is prohibited. In
a case where the copies or phonorecords were lawfully made, the United States Customs Service
has no authority to prevent their importation unless the provisions of section 601 are applicable.
In either case, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe, by regulation, a procedure
under which any person claiming an interest in the copyright in a particular work may, upon
payment of a specified fee, be entitled to notification by the Customs Service of the importation
of articles that appear to be copies or phonorecords of the work.
See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 146.
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private remedy against the importer of piratical goods not expressed in Section
2
602(b).1
The Quality King Court also stressed the importance of the fact that the
first sale doctrine only protects the owner of a copy that was lawfully made,
or with the copyright holder's consent." 3 Thus, Section 109(a) does not
provide protection against "any non-owner such as a bailee, a licensee, a
consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was unlawful."" 4
More importantly, however, the Supreme Court found that Section 602(a)
covers a broader scope of copies that are not subject to the limitations imposed
by Section 109(a)." 5 An example is where the copies are lawfully made under
the laws of another country." 6 Thus, despite the fact that Section 602(a) and
Section 109(a) may coexist in certain situations, both sections "retain
significant independent meaning" whereby Section 602(a) is not rendered
superfluous." 7
L'anza's second argument was that a violation of 602(a) is distinct from
a violation of Section 106(3) because Section 501 refers to Section 106(3) and
Section 602(a) separately in its definition of an "infringer.""' The Supreme
Court addressed L'anza's contention by conceding that the listing of rights in
Section 501 seems to indicate that Section 602 creates a distinct right from
Section 106.1" The Court acknowledged that the use of the words in Section
501 20 "or who imports" lends support to L'anza's view of distinct rights.'
Despite the acknowledgment, the Court relied on the text of 602(a) itself
to provide statutory support to the contrary. 2 1 Section 602(a) directly states
that prohibited importation is a violation under Section 106. Furthermore,
under L' anza' s interpretation, Section 602(a) would not be limited by the first
sale doctrine, nor the rest of the sections between 107 through 120, because

11

See id.

11

See id. at 146-47.

Id.
See id. at 147.
16
See id.("The category of copies produced lawfully under a foreign copyright was expressly
identified in the deliberations that led to the enactment of the 1976 Act.").
17
Id. at 149.
114
115

III

See id.

See id.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994): "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a) or who
imports copies or phonorecords into tie United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the
copyright..."
121
See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 149.
122
See id.
123
See id.
119
12
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it would not be considered a Section 106 right.'7 The Supreme Court refused
to believe that Congress intended to propose an interpretation of Section
602(a) that rendered it independent and immune to those sections.1 25 In
further support of its conclusion, the Court found that L'anza could not
explain "why the words 'under section 106' appear in Section 602(a).' 2 6
The Supreme Court concluded its analysis by acknowledging the
reasoning behind a broad interpretation of the first sale doctrine. 27 "The
whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places
a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted
his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution."'2" The Supreme Court
found no support to the contrary of an unrestricted reading of the statute.
Arguably, the doctrine should not be given a broad interpretation because it
limits the owner's right of control.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

Although Quality King is a case of first impression, the Supreme Court
has previously construed the Copyright Act in light of the same basic purpose
and rationale exhibited in Quality King. One such case is Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 29 which was cited in Quality King.
Bobbs-Merrillalso involved the resale of a copyrighted work as in Quality
King. 30 The publisher, Bobbs-Merrill, fixed a notice on the copyrighted book
indicating that the book could not be sold for less than $1 without its
consent.' 3' The defendants, Isidor Straus and Nathan Straus, purchased copies
of the book with the intent to resell them.'32 Knowing the terms of the notice
sold the books at a price less than $1
on each copy of the book, the defendants
33
without Bobbs-Merrill's consent.
The Supreme Court noted that copyright property was under federal
statutory law and was to be interpreted under the authority conferred "under
article 1, § 8 of the Federal Constitution" for the promotion of "science and
the useful arts.""l3 As such, the copyright statutes should not be extended to

124
's

126
12

In
129

See id. at 150.
See id. at 150-51.
Id. at 149.
See id. at 152.
Id.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

130

See id. at 341-42.

131

See id. at341.

132

See id. at 341-42.
See id. at 342.
Id. at 346.

133
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grant privileges where Congress did not intend, or withhold benefits where
Congress did intend. 3 ' It was upon this background that the Supreme Court
held that the statutory and exclusive right of a copyright owner to multiply and
sell his work only applied to the first sale of his copyrighted production. 36 As
in Quality King, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of
protecting the copyright owner's rights in his work, but refused37to extend the
protection to resales by lawful future purchasers of the work.'
Further support for the rationale used in Quality King can be found in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 3 The Supreme Court in
Sony found that there was no copyright infringement of television program
copyright owners where manufacturers of home videotape recorders sold their
39
equipment to the general public.
Once again, the Supreme Court acknowledged that copyright law was
derived from the Constitution, and that "it is Congress that has been assigned
the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product."'" As reiterated in Quality King, the Supreme Court stressed
the importance of the judiciary's refusal to expand the copyright owners'
protections under the copyright statute without "explicit legislative
guidance."'' Additionally, the Court clarified that where there is ambiguity
in the statutory text of copyright law, it is essential to understand the
underlying balance between the encouragement and reward of creative work,
and the competing public interest in securing the availability of "literature,
music, and the other arts" for the public. 42
VH.CONCLUSION

Although copyright law attempts to reward the copyright owner for his
particular work, the ultimate effect of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good."' 4 3 The statutory protection granted
copyright owners under Title 17 has never granted complete control over all

133
13

137
138

139

140
14
142
143

See id.
See id. at 351-52.
See id.
at 350.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
See id.
ld.at 429.
Id. at 431.

See id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
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uses of the copyrighted work.'" It is for Congress to determine extensions of
these protections where ambiguity exists. 4 5
The gray market has a definite impact on copyright owners, but not all of
these effects are negative. Those in favor of parallel importation have argued
that gray markets benefit consumers by lowering prices, widening distribution,
and negating price discrimination between markets. Thus, gray markets
unquestionably can have a positive effect. But given the negative effects as
discussed earlier, the real question as to why the Supreme Court limited
copyright holders' redress against gray market goods still remains.
The intention of copyright law is of utmost importance in a case such as
Quality King where the statutory language and legislative material is lacking.
Although the copyright owner's interest in receiving his reward is essential,
the history of copyright law has stressed that even more important is the
dissemination of the artistic and creative product to the public. As mentioned
above, the Supreme Court acknowledged this policy consideration in Sony.
As to the effects of the gray market on a copyright owners' reward, such
reward is arguably satisfied from the purchase price received from the first
sale of a particular copy. Once the owner makes that first sale, the policy
towards distribution to the public gives way. If a copyright owner is so
concerned about the effects of the gray market and reaching maximum profits,
he still has a number of alternatives remaining after Quality King. First of all,
the owner should consider minimizing the extent to which he is underselling
the product. Flatter pricing eliminates the profit available to a third party from
reimporting the product and the retailer's opportunity to undercut the domestic
price." Nothing in the language of copyright law requires the copyright
owner to receive the maximum profit he can charge for his copyrighted work.
Another solution available to the copyright holder is that he can change
the name or the label of his package; the products would then be considered
substitutes of the domestic products and not the real thing. 47 The copyright
owner may also consider manufacturing abroad, since the holding of Quality
King does not extend to unauthorized importation of products manufactured
abroad. 4" Moreover, the copyright owner may try to limit foreign distributors
through contractual provisions."' This provides redress in case of breach of

I"

See id.

14

See id. at 431.

146

See Robert W. Clarida, How to Stop ParallelImports Despite Quality King Ruling, INTEul.

PRop. STRATE OSr, May 1998, at 1.
147
149
149

See id.
See id.
See id.
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contract. 150 However, such an agreement may have enforcement problems as
well as jurisdictional issues if not agreed to beforehand.'
Although these alternatives do not resolve the gray market problem, it is
not for the judiciary to decide these issues. The interrelationship between
Sections 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a) involves a problem that was not
foreseeable by the drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act. The Supreme Court in
Quality King did not attempt to solve the gray market problem or its policy
considerations, but only followed its duty to interpret the Copyright Act and
its intention. The Supreme Court said yes to the first sale doctrine instead of
granting copyright owners monopolistic control over the distribution of their
works once they received value for it. If the owners' remaining alternatives
to combat the gray market are deemed egregious, it is for Congress to redefine
the scope of the owners' limited monopoly. In this regard, "[t]he judiciary's
reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright without explicit
legislative guidance is a recurring theme."' 52
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See idt
See id.
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